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Abstract: 
Several factors have been contributing to the growing use of public private-partnership 
(PPP) arrangements by local governments, such as, the need for new investments on 
infrastructure (e.g. decentralization of responsibilities, regulatory requirements 
demanding better quality and environmental protection, renovation of the networks), 
imposition of strict debt limits to the localities, and local government reform 
policies/programs. Whereas contractual PPP arrangements, such as concession 
contracts, can be seen as an extension of traditional public procurement (with additional 
complexities in contract design and management) and are currently better handled by 
contracting authorities, institutionalized PPPs (mixed companies) are still quite puzzling 
for both practitioners and academics. In fact, the following questions deserve further 
investigation: When are mixed companies expected to depict a higher performance than 
other options? What are the risks involved and how should they be allocated and 
mitigated? How should mixed companies be monitored and evaluated? The articles in 
this Special Issue provide insightful answers to these and many other relevant questions 
to policy makers. 




Local governments are responsible for providing a vast number of services, many of them 
“essential” for social welfare. However, financial constraints and expertise limitations 
often represent palpable menaces to the sustainability of these services. For many years 
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now this state of affairs has led practitioners and researchers to consider several 
alternatives for reforming local governments.  
The processes of privatisation, reverse privatisation and corporatisation, for instance, are 
broadly documented and discussed in the literature (inter alia, Vickers and Yarrow 1988 
and 1991, Bös 1991, Warner and Hefetz 2001, Greene 2002, Winston et al. 2002). The 
topic of purely contractual PPP arrangements (cPPPs), such as concession and 
affermage agreements, has earned special attention due to the increasing use of this 
type of procurement model and their difficult implementation because of asymmetric 
information (for a general overview, Hart 2002, Menard and Saussier 2002, Guasch 
2004, Reeves 2008, Warner and Bel 2008, Koppenjan and Enserink 2009).  
The selection, design and governance of mixed companies, instead, has been somewhat 
neglected. Mixed companies consist of joint ventures between public sector entities on 
one side and private operators and/or financial investors on the other. Nowadays, mixed 
companies are used by local governments all over the world, although with special 
incidence in Europe (mainly in Italy, Spain, France, Germany, and Portugal; Verdier et al. 
2004) and South America (especially in Colombia, but also in Cuba and Mexico; Marin 
2009). 
Although theory tells us that mixed companies (or institutionalised PPPs) make sense 
and have advantages in comparison with cPPP (for example, Eckel and Vining 1985, 
Hart 2002, Viallet 1983, Schmitz 2000, and Marra 2007), practice does not confirm this in 
a clear-cut way and often tells us otherwise (Boardman and Vining 1989, Marques and 
Berg 2011, Albalate, Bel and Calzada 2011, and Cruz and Marques 2012).  
Mixed companies represent an interesting governance structure. Well aware that in the 
vast majority of cases the preference of local authorities towards such alternative is 
determined by practical reasons, the purpose of this Special Issue is to provide some 
scientific body of knowledge to this governance structure which has not been sufficiently 
investigated in literature. 
The rationales behind public intervention in the economy and, more specifically, in local 
services are well known. Local public services are intrinsically characterised by market 
failures: many of them, for example, are natural monopolies. This is not the only 
economic justification (although it may be the most important one) adopted by 
municipalities to intervene in service delivery. Further market failures, such as public or 
semi-public goods, asymmetric information and externalities, might need to be addressed 
by direct public sector intervention. Finally, sustainability is also an important factor in 
services having a strong impact on the environment.  
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These considerations weaken the case for privatisation of local services and support 
those in favour of enterprises totally owned and/or run by the public. However, although 
there is sufficient room to justify municipalities entering utilities, the public sector more 
often than not has to involve private operators due to their superior know-how, 
experience, flexibility and financial capabilities.  
Then, the choice of a governance structure to deliver services over another is under the 
responsibility of municipalities. Roughly every local authority has four broad options. It 
can opt for traditional in-house production, indirect delivery trough corporatized public 
services (e.g. municipal companies), cPPP arrangements or mixed companies. The fact 
that with mixed companies the public entity might be both inside and outside the firm 
implies certain peculiarities that make it a special governance structure. 
Unlike what happens with cPPPs, where the private partner is responsible for producing 
the services and its rights and duties are established in a (incomplete) written contract, 
with mixed companies, the public and private partners meet to jointly manage and deliver 
the services (Weber and Alfen 2010).  
Mixed companies seem to be a type of constructive partnership, while purely cPPPs are 
said to be ‘transactional’ because usually they fail to cope with adaptations to shocks 
without triggering formal contractual revisions. By opting for mixed companies, local 
decision-makers try to adopt a relational approach to governance (Reeves 2008 and Cruz 
and Marques 2013).  
The use of mixed companies should place a relatively high degree of control over the 
performance of the services on the public sector side. Indeed, in most cases the 
competent public authorities hold the majority of the shares, therefore retaining the 
dominant influence (Cruz and Marques 2012). The property rights should reduce 
information and monitoring costs due to the increased access of the public partner to 
information regarding day-to-day operations.  
Schmidt (1996) argued that “If the government gives up control of the firm and privatizes, 
then it will have less information about the firm’s costs (and profits) as compared to the 
situation where it controls the firm as a nationalized company. To justify this assumption, 
we have to explain why the government cannot write a contract with the private owner 
requiring that the government will receive all relevant information. The argument is that 
having access to inside information of a firm is not a specific right, which can be 
contracted upon easily, but rather a residual right, which is tied together with ownership. 
Information is not just available in a firm- it has to be produced, collected, accounted, 
processed, and transmitted, and it is the owner who in the end controls this process of 
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information production. Therefore the owner is always able to manipulate the information. 
For example, she may manipulate transfer price, thus shifting profits from one division of 
her firm to another, or she may choose among different depreciation methods, thus 
shifting profits between periods, etc. After the information has been produced, it is 
impossible to verify it to an outsider even if the owner wishes to do so” (Schmidt, 1996, 
9). 
A similar aspect was discussed by Williamson (1975), who emphasised that different 
organisational structures imply different information flows. In particular, the author 
distinguished the information that external auditors (versus internal ones) might collect: 
“An external auditor is typically constrained to review written records and documents and 
in other respects restricts the scope of his investigation to clearly pertinent matters. An 
internal auditor, by contrast, has greater freedom of action, both to include less formal 
evidence and to explore the byways into which his investigation leads” (Williamson, 1975, 
29). According to the interpretation offered by Riordan (1990), Grossman and Hart (1986) 
seemed to deny that ownership gives more information. Discussing the change in 
information following vertical integration, they maintained that no advantage would derive 
from this in terms of information gathering and internal audit even if, in a footnote, they 
specified that the right to audit is sometimes a residual right rather than a contractible 
right, thus confirming that information depends on ownership patterns (Grossman and 
Hart, 1986, 695). 
Thus, asymmetric information should be mitigated in mixed companies, enabling the 
‘internal regulation’ and decreasing the risk of ex-post opportunistic behaviour (Marra 
2007). Even in case of renegotiation of the initial contractual clauses, the public partner is 
better able to cope with principal–agent problems (Guasch 2004). 
As emphasised by Hart (2002), when an incomplete contracting perspective is adopted, 
ownership becomes extremely relevant, and mixed companies can accomplish it.  
“One of the insights of the recent literature on the firm is that, if the only imperfections are 
those arising from moral hazard or asymmetric information, organizational form - 
including ownership and firm boundaries - does not matter: an owner has no special 
power or rights since everything is specified in an initial contract (at least among the 
things that can ever be specified). In contrast, ownership does matter when contracts are 
incomplete: the owner of an asset or firm can then make all decisions concerning the 
asset or firm that are not included in an initial contract (the owner has residual control 
rights). Applying this insight to the privatization context yields the conclusion that in a 
complete contracting world the government does not need to own a firm to control its 
behaviour: any goals - economic or otherwise - can be achieved via a detailed initial 
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contract. However, if contracts are incomplete, as they are in practice, there is a case for 
the government to own an electricity company or prison since ownership gives the 
government special powers in the form of residual control rights” (Hart, 2002, 69). 
However risks of failure of such a governance structure are relevant. 
In their theoretical investigations, Eckel and Vining (1985) found that mixed companies 
can result in the ‘worst of both worlds’, where neither profitable nor social goals can be 
effectively achieved. Currently, we have some indications of the causes for this 
unintended effect: low degree of expertise, absence of ethical standards and lack of clear 
and stable objectives. Moreover, the surrounding environment plays a role in determining 
the chance for the constitution of mixed companies. For instance, Bel and Fageda (2010) 
found that mixed companies are more likely to appear in municipalities with harsh 
financial constraints and where contracting costs are relevant.  
This Special Issue addresses the governance of mixed companies and the use of this 
model by local governments. By accommodating research that combines both theoretical 
and empirical research from different fields of knowledge, the current issue of the Annals 
of Public and Cooperative Economics provides a useful resource to scholars who wish to 
frame their research agenda on the theme and to practitioners and local-decision makers 
trying to design optimal governance structures to provide local public services. 
 
The research 
The Special Issue starts with an article by Asquer (2014) who investigates the case of the 
Italian water sector and shows that mixed companies are related to the historical and 
institutional context as well as to the privatization policy process. The author invites the 
reader to pay attention to the causal role played by initial conditions, reform content 
features, and reform process features – including how these conditions may change over 
time in relation to contemporaneous events. 
The article by Marra and Carlei (2014) presents, on a large-scale basis, an investigation 
on the institutional environment in which privatizations occur. It is well known that the 
planning of privatization operations requires much more than just the selection of which 
firms to privatize, the setting of price per share, the revenue target and percentage of 
stock to sell. The level of corruption, the consistency and continuity of action of the public 
partner, its strategic vision and government commitment and transparency significantly 
affect partial privatization processes and outcomes. This is relevant at both national and 
local level, no matter the sector under observation. In particular, the authors show that 
strategy and administrative burden are important determinants of privatization outcomes, 
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and government commitment and strategic approach to privatization are usually 
associated with partial privatizations.  
In the third article, Vining, Boardman and Moore (2014) address some of the gaps in both 
classification and theory pertaining to mixed companies. The authors sustain that without 
suitable theoretical and normative frameworks it is not possible to correctly evaluate the 
performance of mixed companies. It is argued that there has been insufficient attention to 
the basic normative question, namely: what should the main public policy goal of mixed 
companies be? The authors present three principal-agent models that offer contrasting 
theories of mixed companies’ performance with differing assumptions about the 
motivations and behaviour of the relevant actors.  
Peters, Pierre and Røiseland (2014) do not deny that mixed companies can be suitable 
arrangements for primarily economic functions but ask whether a mixed company would 
function for the management of health, education or even social service organizations. 
According to the authors, there appear to be some major impediments. The authors are 
more concerned with the political and governmental consequences of choosing public-
private partnership as an instrument for policy and look at how the institutionalization of 
public-private partnerships, via the creation of mixed companies, can lead to a shift away 
from public values and towards private ones.  
The article by Moszoro (2014) shows that, in theory, from the efficiency point of view the 
ownership of utilities does not have to be dichotomically public or private. Mixed 
companies can be superior to pure public or private ones because these allow benefiting 
from lower interest rates and efficient private management. The public sector can borrow 
money at a lower cost, while private investors can spawn life-cycle cost savings. In his 
model a Pareto-efficient capital structure is achieved with both the public and private 
parties as shareholders.  
The Special Issue ends with two case-studies. In their article, Swarts and Warner (2014) 
refer to the Berlin transit system and suggest that mixed companies may be less 
important as a means to harness the benefits of private sector management and more 
important as a means to challenge labor rights. The authors find that the primary benefit 
of the partial privatization was to facilitate labor shedding, which was achieved in a 
manner that was inequitable to labor interests and resulted in a subsequent unionization 
effort that eroded many of the labor cost savings. Regarding process and service delivery 
improvement, the authors found that the restructuring of the public sector portions of the 
service was more effective than privatization, and that service quality to the riding public 
was maintained by keeping planning and accountability functions within the public realm. 
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Finally, Wang, Warner and Tian (2014) look at the Shanghai Public Bus System to 
investigate a new mixed model of contracting network to balance government, market 
and social groups. While the subject of the case study was not a mixed company in the 
sense found in Europe and elsewhere, the governance structure investigated (a mixed 
public-public contacting network) offers insights into the core challenges local decision-
makers have emerged to address. According to the authors, the contract between 
government and operators and the participation of social groups helps balance the 
government control. This mixed network mode of management would reduce information 




In its own way, each of the seven articles presented in this Special Issue helps to improve 
our understanding of local mixed public-private companies. It is acknowledged that iPPP 
models are endowed with interesting capabilities to provide local public services. 
Nevertheless, it is of the utmost importance that these arrangements are not merely 
erected to circumvent budgetary or other legal constraints (e.g. public employment laws) 
and that the sustainability of mixed companies is not guaranteed to the detriment of the 
public interest. The focus here has been on the political economy of this governance 
structure. However, mixed companies also pose several legal and technical challenges. 
Although with this model public decision-makers attempt to design a relational agreement 
to partner up with the private sector, local mixed companies are also regulated by the 
shareholders’ agreements (binding the partners), the management contract (establishing 
the obligation of the mixed company towards the local authority), the bylaws (binding the 
managers), the public procurement documents (including the proposal of the winning 
bidder), the national legislation on PPP arrangements, and, if the firms operate in a 
regulated sector, they also are subject to the oversight of the sector-specific regulator. 
This regulatory puzzle significantly reduces the flexibility sought by local governments. In 
fact, future studies on these matters could look into ‘How to establish an effective 
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